Re-verify stored plugin signatures during sync

[samuv]

Summary

Sync is where a lock file becomes an enforcement mechanism: it is what CI runs to assert that what is installed is what was pinned. #6397 made install-time verification record a signer identity and persist the Sigstore bundle on the install record, but nothing re-checked either afterwards — an entry whose stored bundle had been tampered with, swapped, or lost still reported as up to date, so the CI gate covered content drift but not signature drift.

Commit 1 — re-verify stored signatures during sync

• Sync re-verifies each managed entry's stored bundle against the identity its lock entry records, entirely offline via the embedded trust root — no registry access, so --check stays usable in a sandboxed CI runner. A failed re-verification is drift: --check reports it and exits 2, apply mode reinstalls from the pinned reference, where Verify plugin signatures at install time #6397's install-time verification enforces the locked identity and heals the stored bundle.
• An OCI entry recording a signer identity with no stored bundle fails closed rather than passing — a recorded identity with nothing backing it cannot be verified. Git entries store no bundle by design (their signature lives on the commit and is re-verified when content is re-resolved) and entries recorded unsigned: true have nothing to verify, so both skip the offline check.
• Adoption is a trust decision, so --adopt back-fills the entry's provenance from the stored bundle when one exists. With no bundle, adopting is the same trust decision as an unsigned install: it now requires the explicit --allow-unsigned exception and records unsigned: true. Without the flag it fails typed as unsigned-rejected. This tightens --adopt, which previously wrote entries with no trust state at all.
• Adds --allow-unsigned to thv ai-plugin sync and threads the field through the plugins API DTO and the Go HTTP client DTO. plugins.SyncOptions already carried the field (it aliases skills.SyncOptions); nothing was passing it.
• Signature failures classify through the existing errors.Is sentinel mapping to the typed reasons established in Stack 1 (signature-invalid, signer-mismatch, unsigned-rejected). Exit-code semantics are unchanged.

Commit 2 — bound stored signature material (closes the #6396 review thread)

@jhrozek flagged on #6396 that nothing caps what gets written into the sigstore_bundle column, and that the git Payload/Signature that PR started carrying are equally unbounded — commit messages have no length limit, so a hostile repo or registry can push a multi-MB blob into SQLite on every install. #6397 deferred the fix here, because this is the PR where sync starts reading those bytes back on every run.

• All three are capped at capture time in verify.go, before the bytes reach InstallOptions and the store, at 1 MiB — orders of magnitude above a real keyless bundle or gitsign signature (a few KB: certificate chain, signature, inclusion proof).
• Over-limit material is rejected (422), never truncated: a truncated bundle would fail to verify later and be indistinguishable from tampering. The git payload and signature are checked before the verifier is consulted, so a hostile repo cannot spend our CPU either.
• The other Store plugin sigstore bundles, carry git signature #6396 comment — nothing binds a stored bundle to the digest it covers — is answered by the two PRs together: capture derives the pair from a single VerifyOCI/VerifyGit call over that digest (Verify plugin signatures at install time #6397), and commit 1 here re-verifies the stored bundle against the entry's digest on every sync, so a mismatched pair now surfaces as drift instead of sitting unnoticed.

Part of #6300. Mirrors the skills counterpart #6131. Stacked on #6397 — this PR targets plugins-sig/07-install-verify.

Type of change

• New feature

Test plan

• Unit tests (task test)
• Linting (task lint-fix)

Sync re-verification tests mirror the skills suite:

• a stored bundle that no longer verifies reports as drift in --check and is reinstalled at the pin in apply mode;
• verifyStoredSignature table: unsigned and no-provenance entries skip the check, provenance-without-bundle fails closed for OCI and passes for git, a stored bundle delegates to VerifyBundleOffline and its failure propagates;
• a missing bundle classifies as signature-invalid, not unknown;
• adopt back-fills provenance from a stored bundle without needing the flag, rejects an unverifiable bundle rather than silently falling through to unsigned, and without a bundle fails typed unsigned-rejected then records unsigned: true with --allow-unsigned;
• round-trip tests pin the flag at both DTO boundaries (API request → SyncOptions, client → wire) and the CLI flag's binding to the variable sync passes to the service.

Size-cap tests: a table over all four rejection paths (OCI bundle, git bundle, oversized commit payload, oversized commit signature) asserting 422 and validation-rejected, where the payload/signature cases prove the verifier is never called; plus an end-to-end case showing an oversized bundle leaves neither a lock entry nor a DB record.

task docs output verified with ./cmd/help/verify.sh (exit 0, no diffs).

Two pre-existing conditions on this branch and its base, neither introduced here:

• TestMCPGoClientInitializeAndPing (pkg/transport/proxy/streamable) fails locally — its server binds a hardcoded 127.0.0.1:8096, which is in use on this machine.
• task lint-fix was run with golangci-lint v2.12.2, the version CI pins in Pin golangci-lint to avoid nilness panic on main #6393 (v2.13.0 panics in nilness on sentry-go). It reports one gci finding in pkg/authserver/runner/embeddedauthserver.go:249, a file this PR does not touch; the repo is otherwise clean.

API Compatibility

• This PR does not break the v1beta1 API, OR the api-break-allowed label is applied and the migration guidance is described above.

Changes

File	Change
pkg/plugins/pluginsvc/sync.go	Offline re-verification in syncLockedEntry; adoption trust decision in adoptLocked
pkg/plugins/pluginsvc/verify.go	1 MiB ceiling on bundle, commit payload and gitsign signature at capture
cmd/thv/app/ai_plugin_sync.go	--allow-unsigned flag
pkg/api/v1/plugins_types.go, pkg/api/v1/plugins.go	allow_unsigned on the sync request DTO and handler
pkg/plugins/client/dto.go, pkg/plugins/client/client.go	allow_unsigned on the client sync DTO
docs/	Regenerated CLI docs and swagger

Does this introduce a user-facing change?

Yes. thv ai-plugin sync --check now also fails when a plugin's stored signature no longer verifies against the identity pinned in the lock file, not just on content drift. thv ai-plugin sync --adopt now requires --allow-unsigned for installs with no stored Sigstore bundle, and records those entries as unsigned: true; adoptions with a stored bundle back-fill the signer identity into the lock entry instead of leaving trust state empty. An install whose signature material exceeds 1 MiB is rejected.

Special notes for reviewers

• The OCI/git split keys off whether entry.Digest contains a : — the same discriminator the skills implementation uses. Git digests are bare commit hashes, OCI digests are sha256:…. Local-store pins share the OCI digest shape and store no bundle, but cannot reach the fail-closed branch (a local install is always an unsigned trust decision, so its entry returns at the Unsigned check); verifyStoredSignature's doc comment reasons through that case and through a hand-edited lock entry.
• In adoptLocked, the restorable-pin check deliberately still runs before the trust decision, so adopting a bare local-store tag keeps reporting validation-rejected rather than changing to unsigned-rejected.
• ResultFromBundle returning a nil provenance (a key-signed bundle carries no certificate identity) falls through to the unsigned path rather than recording an empty provenance block.
• The equivalent unbounded-blob exposure exists on the skills side, which has no cap today. Out of scope here (this stack does not touch pkg/skills) but worth a follow-up.
• Follow-ups in this stack: the signer-change guard on the upgrade path is PR9; push signing and gate removal are PR10.

Generated with Claude Code

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 77.81%. Comparing base (69fc618) to head (f86c395).

Additional details and impacted files

@@                        Coverage Diff                        @@
##           plugins-sig/07-install-verify    #6399      +/-   ##
=================================================================
- Coverage                          77.85%   77.81%   -0.04%     
=================================================================
  Files                                761      761              
  Lines                              73175    73223      +48     
=================================================================
+ Hits                               56971    56981      +10     
- Misses                             16199    16237      +38     
  Partials                               5        5              

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