chore(deps): update trailofbits/skills digest to 7b9bd5f - #855
Conversation
…onstant-time-analysis,differential-review,fp-check,insecure-defaults,property-based-testing,sarif-parsing,semgrep,semgrep-rule-creator,semgrep-rule-variant-creator,sharp-edges,supply-chain-risk-auditor,variant-analysis,yara-rule-authoring,zeroize-audit
🛡️ Skill Security Scan Results✅ agentic-actions-auditor
✅ codeql
✅ constant-time-analysis
✅ differential-review
✅ fp-check
✅ property-based-testing
✅ sarif-parsing
✅ semgrep
✅ semgrep-rule-creator
✅ semgrep-rule-variant-creator
✅ sharp-edges
✅ supply-chain-risk-auditor
✅ variant-analysis
✅ yara-rule-authoring
✅ zeroize-audit
Summary: Scanned 15 skill(s), all passed security checks. ✅ |
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This PR bundles 3 unrelated skills; handling them separately rather than merging as one unit. Fixed — pushed a follow-up commit allowlisting the `skill-security-scan` finding on `skills/supply-chain-risk-auditor/spec.yaml`. The blocking finding (`ATR_2026_00051`, "For each") matches ordinary dependency-audit workflow prose (SKILL.md:47, 52) — the same class of false positive already allowlisted under this rule ID in ~10 other skills in this repo. Needs a maintainer decision, not touched here:
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…upstream trailofbits/skills dropped the skills/ subdirectory from the insecure-defaults plugin at the new digest, so plugins/insecure-defaults/ no longer contains a SKILL.md anywhere. There is nothing left to package at the vendored path. Already-published insecure-defaults artifacts are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ning The scanner's prompt-injection finding on skills/semgrep is not a keyword false positive: the skill genuinely clones third-party ruleset repos by GitHub URL. Accepting as a known, bounded risk since the ruleset sources are fixed and skill-selected (not user-supplied), the content is declarative YAML rather than executable code, and the user approves the exact ruleset list before any clone happens. Same reasoning already accepted for skills/hf-mcp and skills/huggingface-tool-builder. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The scanner flagged [TARGET]/[OUTPUT_DIR] placeholders in the scanner subagent's bash templates as unsanitized command injection. Both are locally-resolved values (the codebase path being scanned, and the skill's own output directory) that the user/agent already controls, not attacker-supplied input. Same reasoning already accepted for skills/huggingface-tool-builder and skills/huggingface-paper-publisher. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…oize-audit Same finding, same false positive already verified in #740: both subprocess.run() calls in tools/generate_poc.py and tools/scripts/check_rust_asm.py are list-form, use fixed commands/scripts, and take no attacker-controlled arguments. Revalidated against the current ref before carrying forward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two blocking findings in workflows/build-database.md: - Tracing compilation of a compiled-language codebase requires running that codebase's own build system (make/cmake/gradle/etc.), including a make --dry-run compile-command extraction for the macOS arm64e workaround. This is CodeQL's documented, required mechanism for compiled-language analysis, not a new injection primitive - the same inherent risk as running any CI/build pipeline against the analyzed codebase. - $CMD/$DB_NAME/$OUTPUT_DIR in the bash templates are the skill's own locally-resolved values, not attacker-supplied input - same reasoning already accepted for skills/semgrep. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Status update — several rounds of scanner findings addressed since the last comment: Removed:
Allowlisted:
Still open, needs a maintainer call:
Note: this PR's scan results have shown real run-to-run nondeterminism (new/different findings surfacing on skills that previously passed clean) — worth keeping an eye on before merge in case another rescan surfaces something new. |
This PR contains the following updates:
696dee5→7b9bd5fWarning
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