chore(deps): update stripe/agent-toolkit digest to 2ecd560 - #697
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🛡️ Skill Security Scan Results✅ stripe-best-practices
❌ stripe-projects
Blocking issues:
Allowlisted (not blocking):
✅ upgrade-stripe
Summary: Scanned 3 skill(s), found 3 blocking issue(s).
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…ner FPs (#808) * fix: update skill specs for upstream restructures, removals, and scanner FPs Path fixes for upstream repo restructures: - mongodb/agent-skills: atlas-stream-processing renamed to mongodb-atlas-stream-processing - datadog-labs/agent-skills: dd-llmo/ restructured to agent-observability/ (4 skills renamed) Removed skills deleted upstream: - firebase/agent-skills: developing-genkit-js/go/dart removed Security scanner false positive allowlists added for: - grilling (ATR_2026_00051 — conversational prose) - cloudflare (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — curl examples in docs) - claude-api (10 new ATR_2026_* — API documentation patterns) - agentic-actions-auditor (5 rules — security audit skill with intentional attack pattern docs) - gha-security-review (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — attack pattern docs) - mongodb-schema-design (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — mongo shell examples) - firebase-firestore (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — Firestore API examples) - skill-writer (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — meta-skill code patterns) All refs updated to match renovate digest proposals (full SHAs). Local validation passes for all modified skills. Not addressed (left as open renovate PRs with genuine findings): - stripe-projects (#697): prompt injection + skill discovery abuse - gemini-api-dev/interactions-api (#688): fabricated model names + training-data override * fix: add missing scanner allowlist entries for new digest content The updated upstream digests introduced new reference file content that triggers additional scanner rule IDs. All verified as false positives against actual upstream content: - agentic-actions-auditor: ATR_2026_00012/00040/00066 - claude-api: ATR_2026_00032/00113 - codeql: ATR_2026_00010/00012/00066/00111 - firebase-firestore: ATR_2026_00010/00012 - gha-security-review: ATR_2026_00040/00066/00161 - mongodb-atlas-stream-processing: ATR_2026_00010/00013 - mongodb-schema-design: ATR_2026_00012/00062 - sharp-edges: ATR_2026_00012/00161 - skill-writer: ATR_2026_00012/00088/00111 - yara-rule-authoring: ATR_2026_00004/00012/00063/00066 * chore: bump spec.version for all modified skills Required by skillversionbump check — minor bumps for content changes, patch bump for cloudflare (allowlist-only change). * fix: use category-level allowlisting for ATR pattern rules The scanner's LLM meta-analyzer produces non-deterministic results across runs — new upstream content triggers different rule IDs each time. Playing whack-a-mole with individual ATR_2026_* rule IDs is unsustainable. Switch to category-level POLICY_VIOLATION allowlisting for skills where ALL ATR pattern matches are inherently false positives: - Security audit/analysis skills (agentic-actions-auditor, gha-security-review, sharp-edges, yara-rule-authoring, codeql, semgrep-rule-creator, constant-time-analysis): reference files intentionally describe attack patterns for detection - API/SDK documentation skills (claude-api, firebase-firestore, firebase-data-connect-basics, mongodb-schema-design, mongodb-atlas-stream-processing): pattern matches are on documentation prose, code examples, and API references - Meta skills (skill-writer): pattern matches are on skill authoring and evaluation documentation - Datadog observability skills (agent-observability-*): pattern matches are on evaluation and tracing documentation * fix: use correct lowercase category names and add prompt_injection The scanner assigns categories in lowercase (policy_violation, prompt_injection, command_injection). Also adds: - prompt_injection category allowlisting alongside policy_violation - command_injection for semgrep-rule-creator - LLM_SKILL_DISCOVERY_ABUSE for firebase-firestore (official Firebase activation directive, not commercial hijack) - PG_PII_SSN_HARVESTING for agent-observability-eval-bootstrap * fix: add remaining allowlist entries for trace-rca and sharp-edges - agent-observability-trace-rca: PG_EXFIL_MARKDOWN_LINK (Datadog trace links to user's own tenant, same as eval-bootstrap) - sharp-edges: command_injection (Python eval/exec examples in security analysis docs)
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…jects,upgrade-stripe
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Edited/Blocked NotificationRenovate will not automatically rebase this PR, because it does not recognize the last commit author and assumes somebody else may have edited the PR. You can manually request rebase by checking the rebase/retry box above. |
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Triage note, no code change pushed here. The `skill-security-scan` failure on `skills/stripe-projects/spec.yaml` is not keyword noise — Stripe added real, verified new behavior upstream: the skill now instructs the agent to run `stripe projects init`, which dynamically installs and then invokes a second skill (`stripe-projects-cli`) whose content isn't known at packaging time. This is legitimate, documented Stripe CLI-plugin behavior, but it's a genuine trust-extension decision (vendoring a skill that will execute whatever that plugin currently ships), not a false positive to rubber-stamp. Recommend a maintainer explicitly decide whether Stacklok is willing to accept that trust boundary before merging. If yes, the `security.allowed_issues` entries would need to say so honestly (e.g. "first-party Stripe CLI plugin content, not third-party/obfuscated code") rather than claiming it's a scanner misfire. |
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This PR contains the following updates:
ec93d4c→2ecd560Configuration
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