fix(server): stop clone URLs being parsed as git options

[Lucenx9]

User-provided clone URLs were passed to git clone before an end-of-options marker. A URL beginning with - could therefore be parsed as a Git option instead of a repository value.

Add -- before the remote URL and destination so both remain positional arguments, and add focused regression coverage for normal and dash-prefixed clone inputs.

Tests:

• vp test run apps/server/src/sourceControl/SourceControlRepositoryService.test.ts
• vp run --filter t3 typecheck
• Targeted lint and format checks for both changed files

Model: openai/gpt-5.6-sol via OpenCode

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Note

Medium Risk
Changes how clone commands are built for untrusted URLs; scope is narrow but touches security-sensitive shell/git invocation.

Overview
Fixes a command-injection class issue where user-supplied clone URLs passed directly to git clone could be interpreted as Git flags when they start with - (e.g. --upload-pack=...).

cloneRepository now inserts Git’s end-of-options marker (--) before the remote URL and destination directory name so both are always treated as positional arguments. Existing clone expectations were updated, and a regression test asserts dash-prefixed URLs are forwarded safely.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 368ecef. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.}

Note

Pass -- before clone URL and directory in SourceControlRepositoryService.cloneRepository

Inserts an end-of-options marker (--) into the git clone args in SourceControlRepositoryService.ts so dash-prefixed remoteUrl or directoryName values are treated as positional arguments instead of git options. Adds a test for dash-prefixed remote URLs and updates an existing test to assert the new args.

^{Macroscope summarized 368ecef.}

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Bug Fixes
  • Improved repository cloning reliability for remote URLs and destination paths that begin with a dash.
  • Prevented option-like values from being misinterpreted as command-line flags.
  • Added regression coverage to verify these URLs are preserved correctly during cloning.

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[coderabbitai]

No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉

ℹ️ Recent review info

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Repository UI

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro Plus

Run ID: c2ff4851-7915-4e82-847d-e8a8045c1829

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between f035a0f and 368ecef.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)

• apps/server/src/sourceControl/SourceControlRepositoryService.test.ts
• apps/server/src/sourceControl/SourceControlRepositoryService.ts

Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 9 remain after this review.

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

cloneRepository now passes -- before the remote URL and destination. Tests verify standard and option-like URLs use the updated Git argument order.

Changes

Clone argument safety

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Clone command argument boundary apps/server/src/sourceControl/SourceControlRepositoryService.ts, apps/server/src/sourceControl/SourceControlRepositoryService.test.ts	cloneRepository inserts -- before the remote URL and destination. Tests verify the argument order, working directory, destination, and preservation of an option-like URL.

Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 368ec

The change ensures clone URLs and destination names are treated as positional Git arguments, preventing dash-prefixed inputs from being parsed as options. Its scope is localized and covered by regression tests, so no actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal checks and review.

Suggested reviewers: juliusmarminge

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5

✅ Passed checks (5 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly and concisely describes the fix to prevent clone URLs from being parsed as Git options.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description explains the problem, solution, regression tests, and validation checks, and the focused scope matches the template.
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 2 files.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

✨ Finishing Touches

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• Create PR with unit tests

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[Lucenx9]

@coderabbitai review

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[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Not approved

Macroscope's review found this PR not approvable — The production change modifies how untrusted clone URLs and destination names are passed to Git, addressing a security-sensitive option-parsing path. The scope is narrow and regression coverage is included, but the command-invocation security implications warrant additional scrutiny.

^{You can add or adjust custom eligibility rules. Learn more.}

[Lucenx9]

Review: correct ✅

The -- end-of-options marker is the right fix here. Both remoteUrl and preparedDestination.directoryName sit after the marker, so dash-prefixed values are always treated as positional arguments by git. Covering directoryName matters too — it's derived from the user-supplied destinationPath, which was equally injectable. Since args are spawned execFile-style (no shell), -- fully closes the option-injection vector.

Verified:

• Normal URLs are unaffected (-- is a no-op for them) — existing test updated accordingly.
• The new regression test asserts the exact args array at the right seam (mocked GitVcsDriver), consistent with the file's existing test pattern.
• Ran vp test run apps/server/src/sourceControl/SourceControlRepositoryService.test.ts — 8/8 pass.

The PR's tests mock GitVcsDriver, so they prove the args are built correctly but never exercise a real git binary. Filling that gap locally (git 2.55):

• git clone -- "$PWD/src.git" dest → succeeds, -- is a no-op for normal URLs ✅
• git clone -- "--upload-pack=touch /tmp/pwned" dest → fatal: repository '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/pwned' does not exist, exit 128, /tmp/pwned not created — the value stays positional and fails safely ✅
• Control without --: git clone "--upload-pack=..." dest shifts the positional slots (dest is reported as the repository), confirming the option-injection class was real pre-fix ✅

One minor caveat: -- as end-of-options requires git ≥ 2.24 (Nov 2019). The repo pins no minimum git version, but a ~6-year floor is fine in practice — not worth blocking.

Findings (non-blocking, same class elsewhere):

1. GitHubCli.ts#L418 — ["repo", "view", input.repository, ...] passes the user-supplied repository string positionally to gh with no -- guard. A value starting with - hits the same option-parsing issue in the gh CLI. Worth a follow-up.
2. GitVcsDriverCore.ensureRemote (remote add <name> <url>) has the same shape, though the URL there is provider-derived rather than raw user input, so the risk is lower.

Neither blocks this PR — the fix is narrow, correct, and tested. Safe to merge.

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Model: glm-5.3 · Harness: Pi Agent

[Lucenx9]

@codex review

[chatgpt-codex-connector]

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Keep them coming!

Reviewed commit: 368ecef240

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